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Abstract
This paper examines caste-based differences in farmers’ access to bank loans in
rural India. We investigate whether banks practice taste-based discrimination on
the basis of caste. In order to identify potential discrimination, we consider loan
applications and approval decisions separately. We find significant inter-caste differ-
ences in application rates, and evidence of discrimination against Scheduled Tribe
borrowers at the approval stage. To rule out the role of statistical discrimination,
we simulate unobserved credit histories with various distributions. Evidence for
taste-based discrimination persists despite accounting for unobservables. However,
we find that this discrimination does not affect small farmers.
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this paper incorporates findings from WIDER Working Paper 86/2016 ‘Why does caste still influence
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1 Introduction
Access to resources and opportunities can be a critical factor in improving outcomes for
disadvantaged groups. Barriers to accessing social, political and economic opportunities
may not automatically reduce over time, and intervention through legislation and public
policy, for instance through affirmative action, are often necessary. In particular, improv-
ing access to financial resources is widely acknowledged to facilitate upward economic
and social mobility.1 Conversely, lack of access to resources for certain groups based on
race, gender or ethno-social identities can perpetuate inequalities.
In India, caste as a form of social identity remains an enduring predictor of economic
status. It is correlated with occupation and employment (Prakash, 2015; Ito, 2009; Tho-
rat and Attewell, 2007), income and expenditure (Deshpande, 2000), and capital more
generally (Kijima, 2006). Agriculture is the largest employer in India, and due to the
gap between sowing and harvest, bank credit is usually needed to be able to purchase
various inputs (Conning and Udry, 2007). One important avenue through which caste
can influence income and productivity in the rural sector, where agriculture dominates,
is by shaping access to bank credit. The question of whether caste influences access to
credit is thus important, and while there is a general agreement that it does (Burgess
et al., 2005; Kumar, 2013; Pal, 2002; Government of India, 2007), the reasons for these
differences are less clear. One particular concern is whether lenders discriminate on the
basis of caste (Kumar, 2013; Dréze et al., 1997).2
In this paper, we focus on the role of caste in shaping access to financial capital, in par-
ticular bank loans, in rural India. Is there differential access for different caste-groups,
and if so, why? While varying levels of access might signal the presence of discrimination,
they may also arise from the failure to seek resources and capitalise on opportunities. To
make sense of potential caste-based discrimination in accessing credit, it is useful to note
the parallels with discrimination in labor markets (Thorat and Attewell, 2007; Altonji
and Blank, 1999) and the role of racial and gender-based discrimination in accessing bank
credit in the USA (e.g. Blanchflower et al., 2003; Blanchard et al., 2008; Asiedu et al.,
2010). Castes in India can be categorised into four major groups, viz. Scheduled Castes
(SCs; the most disadvantaged), Other Backward Classes(OBCs; of middling disadvan-
tage), Brahmins, the traditionally privileged higher castes, and Scheduled Tribes (STs;
1Equality in access to economic resources has been traditionally viewed as a vehicle to promote
broader social equality. For example, this is the rationale behind passing the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act in 1974 (and the subsequent amendment in 1976) in the United States.
2Akerlof (1976) provides one of the early theoretical explanations regarding the persistence of caste-
based discrimination given informational costs in an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework.
also very disadvantaged).3,4,5
There are at least two ways to explain discrimination within a rational choice framework.
First, the taste-based discrimination proposed by Gary Becker (1971). According this def-
inition, discrimination occurs if the differences in some outcome (loan approvals, wages)
based on race, caste, or a similar attribute, are not ‘objective’. That is, if residual differ-
ences remain even after taking into account all possible borrower or worker characteristics
that are relevant to the outcome, and are attributed to a ‘taste’ for discrimination on
the part of the bank or employer. Second, discrimination may occur due to information
problems relating to unobservable ‘objective’ characteristics – creditworthiness, ability –
leading bank managers or employers to focus on other observable but correlated proxies
such as race to extract the expected value of the relevant characteristic. This is referred
to as statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973, 1998). There is yet another way in which
outcomes might differ systematically by caste or gender or race: if demand for pay, loans,
or jobs varies based on group-belonging (e.g. Chevalier, 2007). In this paper we attempt
to distinguish between these three phenomena.
Though these notions of discrimination are intuitively straightforward to comprehend, the
task of measurement is quite challenging. Empirical studies, for instance on mortgage
lending in the USA, often use survey data to isolate the residual effects of race or gender.
This approach suffers from the well known limitation that potential unobservables might
lead to biased estimates given that such data are observational.6 There is a small but
growing literature that uses randomisation to study discrimination in labour markets
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2009). However, it is difficult to
study loan approvals by banks using randomisation given the practical informational
requirements of applying for loans. Moreover, some aspects of access to credit are not
readily amenable to study through randomisation. For instance, since caste cannot be
randomly allocated, there are limitations in using this approach to study how caste-
belonging influences the propensity to apply for a loan. In view of these limitations, the
literature on discrimination in labour and credit markets has mainly used observational
data, as does our paper. Yet because potential unobservables remain a concern, we employ
counterfactual simulations to investigate how our results might change if we could control
for certain key unobservables. We adapt an approach suggested by Ichino et al. (2008)
3There are substantial, enduring complexities and political agitation around the categorisation of
castes as OBC (Ramaiah, 1992).
4STs are not technically part of the caste system. Yet tribals are one of the most disadvantaged
peoples in India, and most analyses of caste therefore include the ST category, as does the current paper.
5It is generally agreed that the caste system applies not only to Hindus but to followers of other
religions in the Indian subcontinent as well.
6See LaLonde (1986); Duflo et al. (2007)
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and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to simulate a binary ‘credit history’ variable, and
study how the residual effect of caste-group belonging on loan approvals changes with
different distributional assumptions.7
The paper asks the following questions: (a) How does caste influence farmers’ access to
bank loans? (b) Do banks discriminate on the basis of caste? By way of addressing these
questions, the paper also, albeit indirectly, addresses a larger question concerning the
effectiveness of affirmative action policies in the financial sector. While caste-based affir-
mative action in government jobs and admissions to educational institutions (Bertrand
et al., 2010) are more prominent, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has long directed bank
lending towards disadvantaged groups (Reserve Bank of India, 2014, 2004, 2008; Sriram,
2007). These policies are especially significant for bank lending in rural India, where
expanding formal credit is thought to be key to increasing rural incomes.8
We use nationally-representative data from the 2011-12 round of the India Human De-
velopment Survey (Desai and Vanneman, 2015), which enables us to study the decision
to apply for a loan separately from the subsequent approval of this application. We focus
on farmer households in rural India and their borrowings from banks. Our main findings
are as follows. First, caste-wise differences do exist in access to loans and a major part of
these differences can be explained by corresponding differences in application rates. SCs
and STs, the two most disadvantaged groups, are 16-20% less likely to apply for loans
than are Brahmins and OBCs. Second, for those farmers who applied for bank loans,
approval rates are almost uniform across Brahmins, OBCs, and SCs. ST borrowers are
5-7% less likely to have a loan approved. In other words, STs likely face taste-based
discrimination. Third, we argue that this finding is largely robust through a sensitiv-
ity analysis that constructs counterfactual scenarios concerning a key unobservable, viz.
credit histories. Fourth, we find positive supportive evidence regarding the success of
the RBI’s affirmative action initiatives for lending to small farmers. Dividing the sample
according to land ownership, we find that caste-based differences in loan application and
approval rates are largely muted for small farmers. Fifth, we find that the taste-based
7Although we refer to credit histories, the approach is more general, and can be interpreted in terms
of any other key unobservable which might be considered relevant e.g. the quality of land, effort, or
productivity.
8Though there is no equivalent legislation to the United States’ Equal Credit Opportunity Act
in India, the RBI has long encouraged banks to lend to ‘priority-sectors’, including SCs, STs and
small farmers. For instance, a recent circular on priority lending targets and classification specifies
a target of ‘18 percent of Adjusted Net Bank Credit (ANBC) or Credit Equivalent Amount of Off-
Balance Sheet Exposure, whichever is higher’ towards agricultural sector. The corresponding tar-
get for ‘weaker sections’, of which SC, ST, small and marginal farmers are a part, is ‘10 percent
of ANBC or Credit Equivalent Amount of Off-Balance Sheet Exposure, whichever is higher’. See
https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=9688Mode=0
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discrimination against STs is visible mainly in states with substantial ST populations,
and not where they are a small minority.
Our study has certain key advantages over previous work in this area. Researchers so
far have studied the determinants of access to credit including caste (Kumar, 2013; Pal,
2002) and whether farmers are credit-constrained (Kochar, 1997). These studies control
for credit-worthiness characteristics including land-ownership, household demographics,
and indicators of economic status, but do not control for the decision to seek credit.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to study rural bank lending in India
using data that include information about loan applications. This enables us to explicitly
distinguish between lender-based differences in loan approval rates and borrower-based
differences in the demand for credit.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data, while
section 3 lays out our empirical approach. Results are presented in section 4, and section
5 discusses their implications.
2 Data
We use data from the second round of the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), a
nationally-representative household survey undertaken in 2011-12 (Desai and Vanneman,
2015). These data provide information on a rich set of social, economic and demographic
characteristics which are well suited to analysing the determinants of households’ borrow-
ing. Crucially, households were asked whether they had applied for loans from various
sources, and the success of those applications. This question is critical to exploring
whether any caste-wise differences in loan patterns do indeed reflect discrimination on
the part of lenders, and to our knowledge, no other large-scale household survey in India
has asked this question.9 As per the questionnaire, data on bank loan applications and
approvals refer to those during the five years preceding the survey.
We focus only on formal sector, i.e. bank loans in the current paper. Such loans are widely
considered superior than what the informal sector provides, owing to the usurious lending
practices in the latter. Therefore, the question of caste-based differences is importance
for the formal sector. It is also usually assumed that given a choice, farmers would opt for
9The National Sample Survey Organisation’s All India Debt and Investment Survey is the other main
source of information on household’s access to credit. This is a decennial survey, conducted most recently
in 2013. In keeping with previous rounds, it asks about the details of existing loans but does not ask
about loan applications.
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formal sector loans (e.g. Kochar, 1997). Therefore, excluding informal sector borrowings
is also unlikely to compromise the identification of caste-based differences in application
and approval rates for formal sector loans.
The second round of the IHDS data currently consist of individual and household-level
information, but village-level information are covered only in the first round of the survey
that took place in 2004-05. In particular, the presence of a bank in the village or distance
to the nearest such is potentially an important covariate that helps control for loan supply.
But, since the data on village covariates are from the earlier survey round, we present
results with and without including them and do not find these to be significantly different.
We focus on farmer households in the rural sector, which we define as those households
who report a) their main occupation as cultivation, and b) that they cultivate land.
We focus on the 18 largest states (out of 28), and exclude Jammu and Kashmir, the
North-Eastern states, Union Territories, Delhi and Goa, since these account for very few
loans. Table 1 presents means and proportions for all variables by caste-group, and all
statistics shown are population estimates that take survey weights into account, as do all
our estimations.
Caste-wise means and proportions follow expected patterns in that land ownership, rent-
ing and leasing, incomes, and access to credit are all higher for Brahmins and OBCs,
followed by SCs and then STs. It might seem surprising that average incomes are lower
than average consumption expenditure, even though the former is an annual figure and
the latter monthly. The survey documentation (Desai and Vanneman, 2015) offers two
reasons for this: first, several incomes are negative, reflecting the precarious nature of
cultivator livelihoods. Second, calculating incomes is notoriously difficult when several
components are measured in kind.10
3 Empirical framework
Our analysis seeks to estimate the residual effects of caste belonging on the demand for
loans, as well as their subsequent approval. We use logit specifications to model both
the decision to apply for an agricultural loan, and subsequent loan approvals for those
who applied. For household i, let Y1i and Y2i denote the binary outcomes of applying for
an agricultural bank loan and, respectively, having this application approved and thus
10This pattern is also borne out by data from the National Sample Survey Organisation. See table 2
in Mishra (2008)
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Table 1: Means and proportions by caste-group
N=8,543 Brahmin OBC SC ST
Loans
Proportion currently have loan 0.422 0.406 0.285 0.206
Proportion applied for loan 0.445 0.428 0.306 0.243
Proportion loan approved if applied (N=3,619) 0.947 0.947 0.930 0.849
Land and income
Land owned (acres) 15.635 12.097 7.138 10.129
Land rented in (acres) 2.106 2.567 2.280 1.568
Land rented out (acres) 2.003 1.515 1.261 1.182
Monthly consumption expenditure (Rs ‘000) 133.255 109.646 85.422 62.919
Annual income (Rs ‘000) 133.087 90.237 66.278 51.817
Education and household composition
Age of household head 53.787 52.076 51.103 49.249
Proportion with male household head 0.946 0.944 0.948 0.920
Years of education highest male 8.587 7.325 6.162 5.461
Years of education highest female 6.025 4.203 3.388 2.686
Household size 5.303 5.379 5.242 5.261
Household proportion adult males 0.380 0.356 0.340 0.341
Household proportion adult females 0.362 0.354 0.345 0.343
Village characteristics
Distance to nearest bank branch (km) 5.705 5.942 6.543 8.500
Distance to nearest town/city (km) 14.411 15.537 16.493 22.113
Percentage of households with electricity 62.248 58.413 55.701 45.788
State population proportions
Himachal Pradesh 0.673 0.076 0.223 0.029
Punjab 0.740 0.167 0.093 0.000
Uttarakhand 0.230 0.237 0.533 0.000
Haryana 0.575 0.352 0.071 0.002
Rajasthan 0.180 0.531 0.168 0.121
Uttar Pradesh 0.311 0.562 0.127 0.000
Bihar 0.278 0.622 0.087 0.013
West Bengal 0.484 0.185 0.296 0.035
Jharkhand 0.151 0.270 0.096 0.484
Orissa 0.102 0.523 0.170 0.205
Chhattisgarh 0.026 0.491 0.077 0.405
Madhya Pradesh 0.230 0.481 0.091 0.198
Gujarat 0.325 0.443 0.051 0.182
Maharashtra 0.375 0.471 0.060 0.094
Andhra Pradesh 0.319 0.480 0.174 0.027
Karnataka 0.265 0.587 0.062 0.086
Kerala 0.677 0.275 0.048 0.000
Tamil Nadu 0.117 0.712 0.157 0.015
Notes:
This table presents means and proportions of all covariates used according to caste group, viz. Brahmin, OBC,
SC and ST. All statistics are estimates for the population that take into account survey probability weights.
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receiving a loan. We model the probability of each outcome using a logit specification:
Pr[Y1i = 1|X] = e
X′β
1 + eX′β
(1)
∀i s.t. Y1i = 1,Pr[Y2i = 1|X] = e
X′β
1 + eX′β
(2)
X is a vector of covariates that includes caste-group dummies and β is a vector of
coefficients that we seek to estimate. We use the same set of covariates to model loan
applications and approvals, since a priori there is no theoretical rationale to exclude any
of them.
Unbiased estimation of the residual effects of caste-group on loan applications and bank
approval decisions requires controlling for characteristics that influence application deci-
sions and respectively, signal creditworthiness. To this end we include variables known to
influence access to credit (see, for example, Pal, 2002; Swain, 2007), including household
income and land owned – the latter the primary form of collateral demanded by banks.11
Second, we must account for the supply of loans. For loan applications, distance to the
nearest bank (including if a bank is present in the village) is an important indicator of the
access to credit. This distance might also function as a proxy of banks’ knowledge about
potential borrowers, thus influencing approvals. We include this distance as a village-
level covariate, together with two indicators of development and connectedness, viz. the
proportion of households with electricity, and the distance to the nearest town/city. Un-
fortunately the data on these covariates are not ideal, since they are from an earlier round
of the IHDS survey conducted in 2004-05. However the results are essentially identical
with or without these village-level covariates, thus suggesting that this data limitation is
not a serious problem.
We now focus on loan approvals. Analyses of racial discrimination in access to mort-
gage or small business loans typically control for past repayment histories and default
behaviour (e.g. Blanchflower et al., 2003). Since credit ratings and the bureaus that main-
tain such information are not prevalent in the rural Indian context, it is unlikely that
banks systematically use such information.12 Nonetheless, credit histories or ratings could
influence loan applications or approvals, and to the extent that they might be correlated
with caste-group, their exclusion could lead to biased estimates. In particular, informa-
11According to the Reserve Bank of India’s guidelines, banks should not demand collateral for loans of
up to Rs 50,000, and for larger loans, land is the main form of collateral (Reserve Bank of India, 2007).
12In the case of lending to small businesses, banks are also known to gather ‘soft’ information on
creditworthiness in the absence of credit ratings (Berger and Udell, 2002).
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tion on repayment rates or credit histories is important to distinguish between statistical
discrimination (owing to caste-repayment correlation), and taste-based discrimination.13
We can infer the latter should residual caste-wise differences persist even after controlling
for repayment histories.
However, the data do not provide information on repayment histories or a suitable proxy.
Instead, we therefore examine their potential role through a Monte-Carlo simulation ap-
proach adapted from Ichino et al. (2008). This approach tests the sensitivity of our
estimation results to the presence of an unobservable. Section 4.1 details the method,
and the intuition is as follows. Excluding credit histories would lead to biased estimates
if (unobserved) credit histories are correlated with caste-group as well as a bank’s deci-
sion to lend. We can simulate a variable that is correlated with both a caste-group of
interest and loan approvals and re-estimate our results. Using Monte-Carlo draws and
varying the correlation between the simulated variable and, respectively, caste-group and
loan approval, we can study the distribution of caste-group residuals by repeatedly re-
estimating the model. The difference between these results and the estimates obtained
without the simulated variable provide a handle on the sensitivity of results, and thus
the potential importance of credit histories. It is important to note that credit history
is only one potential unobservable. The analysis can be interpreted more generally, as
accounting for the influence of any such potential unobservable that is correlated with
caste-group and loan approvals.
Finally, it seems plausible to assume the absence of reverse causation. That is, in the
short run at least, it is unlikely that loan applications, and more importantly the receipt
of agricultural loans, would influence any of the right hand side variables.
4 Results
The first three rows of table 1 provide (unadjusted) caste-wise proportions in terms of
access to credit. The first row confirms that there exist substantial inter-caste differ-
ences in loan access, and in particular, SC and ST borrowers have relatively low access
to credit. These proportions are the type of statistic provided in official reports such as
National Sample Survey Organisation (2005), and previous analyses essentially examine
how these proportions change once borrower characteristics are accounted for, but do not
differentiate between loan applications and their approval (e.g. Kumar, 2013). In con-
13Kumar (2013) uses data from the National Sample Survey Organisation which lists past repayments,
and finds that these rates are not correlated with caste-group, but this analysis excludes STs.
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Table 2: Logit estimation results
Model Loan applications Loan approvals
OBC SC ST OBC SC ST
(1) State dummies 0.892 0.531 0.411 1.062 0.823 0.368
(0.081) (0.062) (0.055) (0.272) (0.289) (0.130)
p=0.000 p=0.010
(2) Model 1 plus land and incomea 1.041 0.744 0.589 1.116 0.948 0.435
(0.095) (0.092) (0.085) (0.278) (0.329) (0.149)
p=0.000 p=0.034
(3) Model 2 plus education and 1.076 0.784 0.642 1.220 1.151 0.484
household characteristicsb (0.099) (0.099) (0.094) (0.297) (0.381) (0.167)
p=0.000) p=0.053
(4) Model 3 plus village characteristicsc 1.075 0.783 0.658 1.205 1.155 0.523
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.299) (0.384) (0.177)
p=0.000 p=0.080
Notes:
This table presents estimates from logit models in terms of odds ratios. Only the coefficients for caste dummy are shown, with the
full regression results given in appendix A. The base category is Brahmins. All estimates are survey-weighted, and standard errors
in parentheses account for village-level clustering as per the survey design. The p-values shown are for Wald tests for the null that
all three caste dummies are jointly zero. Sample size is 8,543 for loan application models and 3,619 for loan approval models.
a Land owned, land rented out, land rented in, household monthly consumption expenditure, and annual income.
b Age and sex of household head, years of education of highest-educated male and female, household size, household proportion of
adult males and females.
c Distance to nearest bank branch, distance to nearest town/city, proportion households with electricity.
trast, this paper aims to investigate the role of caste in both applications and approvals.
The second row shows that inter-caste differences in loan applications might indeed help
explain patterns of overall access. Loan application rates follow the stereotypical caste
hierarchy, with Brahmins the most likely to apply, followed by OBCs, SCs, and finally
STs; a similar pattern to that of average consumption expenditures and incomes for in-
stance. The magnitudes of these differences are substantive, with STs about half as likely
to apply for a bank loan as Brahmins.
The third row of table 1 suggests that loan approvals are also not uniform across all caste-
groups: while 93%-95% of loan applications by Brahmins, OBCs and SCs are approved,
the proportion for STs substantially lower, at 85%. Our approach aims to analyse the ex-
tent of residual inter-caste differences that remain in loan application and approval statis-
tics once we control for household characteristics that proxy ability, credit-worthiness, and
access.
Table 2 presents the estimation results from a series of logit models. These are presented
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in terms of odds ratios for respective caste dummies. In all cases the Brahmin caste
group is the base category, and full regression results are presented in appendix A. The
bottom part of each row reports p-values from Wald tests of joint equality of all three
caste dummies.
We estimate two sets of models, one for loan applications (columns 2-4) and one for their
subsequent approval by a bank resulting in a loan (columns 5-7). For instance, the first
row says that in a simple model that includes only state dummies, the odds ratio for
an SC household applying for a loan (respectively, having that application approved)
relative to Brahmins is 0.531 (respectively, 0.823). This simple model thus mirrors the
unadjusted caste-wise proportions in table 1.
Subsequent rows in table 2 show how respective odds ratios change as additional variables
are added to the model. Row 2 adds household-level characteristics including land owned,
rented out and rented in, and income and consumption expenditure, while row 3 adds
the age and sex of the household head, the years of education of the most educated male
and female members, household size, and the proportion of adult males and females.
Row 4 adds village-level information on distance to the nearest bank and to the nearest
town/city, and the proportion of households with electricity. In general, as we move
from simpler to more complex models, inter-caste differences in both applications and
approvals are reduced as more covariates are controlled for. The odds ratios become
closer to unity even though, as the p-values suggest, substantive inter-caste differences
persist.
To examine how these estimation results relate to unadjusted the caste-wise proportions
in table 1, we calculate the predicted probabilities of loan application and approval. We
report the sample-averaged predicted probabilities corresponding to model 4 in table 3
(those for model 3 are very similar, as the odds ratios would suggest). These sample-
averaged predicted probabilities have the useful interpretation of the treatment effect of
caste-group belonging, provided that the estimation model has been correctly specified
and that there are no omitted variables. For these predictions, all variables except caste
are held at their sample values, and the caste variable is changed to Brahmin (say) to
calculate the predicted probabilities for Brahmins, and likewise for other caste-groups.
The decision to hold all non-caste variables at their sample values (rather then means,
for instance) ensures that these calculations have a genuine interpretation as the actual
probabilities that would have resulted were all households Brahmin (and so on). The bot-
tom half of each row provides results from Wald tests for comparisons of these caste-wise
predictions, and these show that inter-caste differences are also statistically significant.
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Table 3: Predicted probabilities by caste group
Loan applications Loan approvals
Brahmin OBC SC ST Brahmin OBC SC ST
0.405 0.419 0.357 0.324 0.937 0.947 0.945 0.892
(0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.026)
All castes equal: p=0.000 All castes equal: p=0.218
ST and non-ST equal: p=0.047
Notes:
This table shows sample-average probabilities by caste group predicted by model 4 in table 2.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. p-values correspond to Wald tests for respective null hypotheses.
Columns 2-5 of table 3 show that loan applications vary by caste, in a way that mir-
rors unadjusted proportions (table 1) but with attenuation. This pattern confirms that
residual inter-caste differences in loan application rates are an important factor behind
differences in overall access to credit. Next, columns 6-9 show that Brahmins, OBCs and
SCs all have similar rates of loan approval, but that the corresponding rate for STs is
about 5% lower.14 This distinct residual difference despite controlling for a rich set of
relevant covariates suggests that banks might discriminate against STs. So far we have
focused on loan applications and approvals, but not loan amounts or interest rates. Banks
can also discriminate by providing smaller amounts or lending at higher interest rates to
certain caste-groups. We examine this possibility in appendix B and find that conditional
on household and village characteristics, overall, there are no significant residual effects
of caste-group belonging on loan amounts or interests rates.
Recall that while taste-based discrimination captures residual inter-caste differences after
controlling for all relevant characteristics, one or more of these characteristics might be
unobserved. In our case, while we have controlled for important indicators of credit-
worthiness – in particular in the form of collateral (land) and incomes – the data do not
have information about credit histories. Similarly, additional borrower characteristics
might also influence a bank’s decision to lend, such as the quality (and not just area)
of land owned. If one or more of these unobserved characteristics are correlated with
caste, then residual inter-caste differences in loan approvals might simply reflect statistical
discrimination on the part of lenders. Since they do not have explicit information on,
for instance, repayment abilities, but have found through past experience that certain
14The predicted approval rates STs in table 3 are lower than the average of approval rates for Brahmins,
OBCs and SCs by 0.051 (S.E.= 0.026, p-value=0.047)
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caste-groups have lower repayment rates, then a bank could simply use caste-group as a
proxy for repayment abilities.
While the ethical appropriateness of this decision is questionable, it is not hard to see
why lenders might resort to such decisions when driven by profit motives. In that case,
the estimated residual differences using our data might in fact be a combination of statis-
tical and taste-based discrimination. In order to examine whether the observed residual
differences are solely due to taste, we need to control for potential sources of statistical
discrimination.
We propose a procedure to investigate this through a simulation approach.
4.1 A simulation approach to unobserved credit histories
Suppose that credit histories influence banks’ decisions to approve agricultural loans,
and that as a group, STs have inferior credit histories compared to non-STs. Then, our
finding that ST group-belonging has a residual, negative effect on loan approvals, might
get partially or fully explained away by controlling for loan histories in equation 2. That
is, while our results suggest that banks discriminate against STs, the absence of this
variable in the data means that we cannot infer whether the discrimination is statistical
– if STs have worse credit histories on average – or taste-based.
We approach this problem using Monte-Carlo simulation, adapting an approach suggested
by Ichino et al. (2008) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Both papers investigate how
including a hitherto binary unobservable might change the estimate of a treatment effect.
They assume that assignment to treatment is not unconfounded if the unobservable (e.g.
creditworthiness) is excluded from the estimation, but becomes so once it is controlled for.
Ichino et al. (2008) implement this idea for treatment effects estimation using propensity
score matching, and propose a simple way of parameterising the distribution of the binary
unobservable. Partitioning the set of observations into four quadrants according to (bi-
nary) treatment status and (also binary) outcome, four corresponding probabilities that
the unobservable equals one are specified. Monte-Carlo draws are used to construct the
unobservable such that it conforms, on average, to this set of probabilities. Throughout
the discussion of this simulation approach, we focus only on households who have applied
for loans.
The treatment effect is then re-estimated for each draw having included the unobserv-
able as a covariate, and this exercise is repeated across multiple draws and with different
combinations of the probabilities characterising the unobservable. Using Ichino et al.
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(2008)’s notation, if the number of simulations undertaken is m and the estimated treat-
ment effect for the kth simulation is ˆATT k, then the overall estimate ˆATT is obtained
as 1
m
∑m
k=1
ˆATT k. If se2k denotes the variance of ˆATT k then the variance of ˆATT is
calculated as (eq.11, p.321):
T =
1
m
m∑
k=1
se2k +
m+ 1
m(m− 1)
m∑
k=1
( ˆATT k − ˆATT )2 (3)
We adapt Ichino et al. (2008)’s method for characterising the distribution of the unob-
servable, even as our set-up is more similar to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) who use a
logit model to estimate the effect of a binary treatment on a binary outcome. Note that
‘treatment’ in our case is the categorical variable of caste-group belonging, and outcome
is the binary loan-approval. Caste-group cannot be manipulated in reality, but concep-
tually we are studying the consequences that would arise as if it could. And, caste-wise
differences in predicted loan approval probabilities calculated by averaging over the full
sample (as we did in table 3) are in effect estimates of this treatment effect.
Since our focus is on potential taste-based discrimination against STs, for this part of
the analysis the four caste categories can be simplified to just two: ST and non-ST. This
simplification is also intuitively appealing: our results thus far suggest that differences
in loan approvals between Brahmins, OBCs and SCs are negligible, and it is the gap
between these groups and STs that potentially suggest institutional discrimination.
4.1.1 Constructing the unobservable
We consider only those households who have applied for a bank loan, and our focus is on
loan approvals. Let H denote hitherto unobserved credit histories, where for household
k, Hk can either be 1 (good history) or 0 (poor history).15 Let STk = 1 if household k
belongs to a Scheduled Tribe, and STk = 0 for all other caste-groups. And, let Y denote
loan approval outcomes, with Yk = 1 if the loan is approved and Yk = 0 if it is denied.
In the following, we omit the subscript k for clarity unless otherwise indicated. We can
partition households into four mutually exclusive groups based on their caste-belonging
and loan approval outcomes: {Y = i, ST = j}, i, j ∈ {0, 1}. For instance, {Y = 0, ST =
1} denotes ST households who have been denied loans. Let Pij be the probability that
15The choice of a binary confounder is a simplification over a more generalised, continuous confounder.
Ichino et al. (2008) show, through Monte-Carlo simulation, that this choice is conservative: if results are
in fact vulnerable to the inclusion of a confounder, then a simulation exercise using a binary instead of
continuous confounder is less likely to lead to the (mistaken) conclusion that results are robust.
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households with loan approval status Y = i and caste group ST = j have a good credit
history.16 That is
Pij = Pr(H = 1|Y = i, ST = j) i, j ∈ {0, 1} (4)
Then the set {P00, P01, P10, P11} fully characterises the distribution of H. An intuitive
way of interpreting these probabilities in terms of a bank’s decision to approve loans is
as follows: let the total sample population be N and θij denote the proportion of this
sample in each of the sets {Y = i, ST = j} where i, j ∈ {0, 1}17:
θij =
1
N
N∑
k=1
1ij(k), (5)
where 1ij is the indicator function:
1ij(k) =
1 if k ∈ {Y = i, ST = j}0 otherwise
In the absence of banks practicing taste-based discrimination against STs, the probability
that a loan is approved conditional on good credit history will be the same for both ST
and non-ST households. Denote this b. Then
b = Pr(Y = 1 | H = 1, ST = 1) = P11θ11
P11θ11 + P01θ01
(6)
and
b = Pr(Y = 1 | H = 1, ST = 0) = P10θ10
P10θ10 + P00θ00
(7)
Now let µST (µnon) denote the proportion of ST (non-ST) households with good credit
histories. Then
µST =
P11θ11 + P01θ01
θ11 + θ01
(8)
µnon =
P11θ11 + P01θ01
θ11 + θ01
(9)
Together, equations 6-9 contain four unknowns (viz. P10, P11, P00, P01) while the θij terms
16These definitions are along the lines of Ichino et al. (2008).
17The θij terms are all sample statistics. For STs, we have θ11 = 0.849 and θ01 = 0.151, while for
non-STs we have θ10 = 0.945 and θ00 = 0.055.
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are all sample estimates. Solving eqns. 6-9 we get:
P00 = (1− b)µnon(θ10 + θ00)
θ00
; P10 = b
µnon(θ10 + θ00)
θ10
P01 = (1− b)µST (θ11 + θ01)
θ01
; P11 = b
µST (θ11 + θ01)
θ11
(10)
The aim is to investigate whether poorer credit histories amongst STs could be an ex-
planation for their lower rates of loan approval. We therefore assume that µnon ≥ µST ,
and simulate unobservable credit histories H for different combinations of {b, µST , µnon}.
Not all combinations are feasible, since each of µST , µnon, b, P00, P01, P10, P11 must all lie
between 0 and 1, which can be verified using eq. 10.
4.1.2 Simulation results
With caste-group belonging simplified to ST and non-ST, the baseline difference in loan
approval rates using all available covariates (i.e. model 4 in table 2) is 0.053 (s.e.=
0.026, p-value=0.042). Figure 1 summarises how this approval gap changes if we control
for unobserved credit histories across a range of distributional assumptions. The figure
consists of two parts: subfigure (a) provides the estimated loan approval gaps, while
subfigure (b) provides the corresponding p-values using standard errors defined in eq. 3.
In this figure we have held µST , the proportion of STs with good credit histories, at 0.1.
To put this into perspective, we know that about one in four STs applied for a loan
(table 1), so µST = 0.1 assumes that just under half this proportion have good credit
histories.18 With µST = 0.1, we assume that µnon ≥ 0.1 since the aim is to examine
whether higher loan approval rates for non-STs might in fact arise from better credit
histories. In appendix C we provide further results holding µST = 0.25 and µST = 0.5,
which we find to be qualitatively identical to those with µST = 0.1.
At each point in figure 1, the distribution of simulated credit histories H is given by µnon
along the y-axis and b along the x-axis. Thus, loan approval becomes more dependent
on credit history as we move along the x-axis, and the proportion of non-STs with good
credit histories rises as we move along the y-axis. The figure is constructed using Akima
interpolation based on a grid of 558 points with 200 replications per point.19
18Of course everyone with a good credit history need not apply for a loan.
19The blank spaces arise from unfeasible combinations of of {µnon, µST , b} following eq. 10.
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How does our original result change once we account for unobservable credit histories?
Not very much. The figure shows that ST loan approval rates remain at least 4-6% lower
than those for non-STs, and this gap can potentially widen, for a range of distributional
assumptions concerning H. The darker shades in subfigure (a) denote the area where our
result remains valid, while subfigure (b) shows that the associated p-values are statistically
significant. Regardless of the proportion of non-STs being multiple times that of STs, the
approval gap still remains – indeed can increase – even if banks increasingly base loan
approvals on credit histories; i.e. 0.5 ≤ b ≤ 0.9.
The approval gap reduces and can approach zero if b > 0.9 provided µnon ≥ 0.2. Thus, if
loan approval is strongly conditional on credit histories (b > 0.9) and if the proportion
of non-STs with good credit histories is at least double that of STs (0.2 vs 0.1), then
the evidence towards taste-based discrimination weakens. Notice that the region where
the result is weakened is relatively smaller, and it is here that loan approval gaps can be
explained by statistical discrimination.
Do banks taste-discriminate against ST borrowers? The results from this simulation ex-
ercise suggest that likely answer is yes, since the residual effects of caste-group belonging
are robust to the inclusion of hitherto unobserved credit histories for most, but not all
specifications. Provided bank lending is not strongly predicated on good credit histo-
ries, the gap between STs and non-STs in most cases remains at least 4-6% even after
accounting for credit histories.
To recap, our analysis so far suggests the presence of inter-caste differences in loan appli-
cation and approval rates. However, these aggregate results can potentially mask diverse
patterns across states and individuals. Below, we reexamine these results by dividing our
sample along two specific dimensions. The first of these is land ownership, motivated by
the RBI’s policy directive to banks to enable access to small farmers, defined as those
who own 5 acres or less. The second is the relative demographic presence of STs at the
state level, motivated by possibility of potential gains that their greater numeric strength
might bring about.
4.2 Small farmers
The Reserve Bank of India has long recognised the challenges faced by small and marginal
farmers in accessing agricultural loans. Its policy guidance has encouraged banks to set
aside a proportion of overall lending for the ‘priority sector’, and within this certain
‘weaker sections’, which include small farmers (Reserve Bank of India, 2007). Small
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Figure 1: Simulation results
Notes: This figures summarise the results from the simulation exercise where we hold µST , viz.
the proportion of STs with good credit histories, at 0.1. Values for µnon, viz. the proportion of
non-STs with good credit histories, are along the y-axis, while values for b, viz. the probability
that banks will approve a loan conditional on good credit history, are along the x-axis. Each
point thus corresponds to a given distribution of credit histories H according to combinations of
{b, µST = 0.1, µnon}. For each combination, the simulation is performed 200 times to re-estimate
model 4 in table 2 with caste simplified to ST and non-ST, and with H included as an additional
regressor. For each regression, we calculate the difference in sample average predicted probabilities
of loan approval for STs and non-STs. Subfigure (a) shows the average of these differences across
simulations, i.e. the likelihood by which STs are less likely to have a loan approved compared to
non-STs once credit histories are controlled for. Subfigure (b) shows the corresponding p-values
calculated using equation 3. The simulations are based on a grid of 558 values with 200 simulations
per point. These values are then interpolated using Akima interpolation. The blank areas are due
to several combinations of {b, µST = 0.1, µnon} being unfeasible (see eq. 10).
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farmers are defined by land holdings of 5 acres or less. We now estimate our results
separately for small farmers and for farmers who own more than 5 acres of land, to
examine whether there is supportive evidence towards this policy’s effectiveness.20
The top half of table 4 presents these results. As in the preceding section, the model
specification includes all available covariates, and appendix A presents the full regression.
These results show that inter-caste differences in application rates are stark only for large
farmers. For small farmers there exist minor differences suggestive of the pattern we
witness in the full sample, but their magnitude is far smaller. Similarly, looking at
loan approvals, potential discrimination against STs is apparent only for large farmers;
for small farmers the loan approval rates are essentially indistinguishable across caste
groups.
This suggests that RBI guidance for lending to weaker sections may well be proving
effective, even though our data do not allow us to examine this question directly. Not
only are loan approval rates essentially equal across caste groups for small farmers, they
are also slightly higher than the corresponding rates for large farmers. The same goes
for loan application rates, in that small farmers are slightly more likely to apply for
loans, and significant inter-caste differences exist only for large farmers. It would appear
that banks use less discretion in lending to small farmers, and having experienced this
willingness to lend over time, small farmers are more likely to apply for loans.
4.3 States with significant ST populations
STs are widely regarded as one of the most disadvantaged groups in Indian society, and
according to the 2011 census they constitute nearly 9% of the total population. Their
distribution is quite uneven across the states, and as table 1 affirms, STs are a substantive
proportion in a few states but a very small minority in most others.21 We might expect
that in states where STs are a relatively larger minority, they would garner greater polit-
ical and economic agency, and thus be less susceptible to discrimination. Alternatively,
in these states, they might also become a more visible target for discrimination if they
are competing with other caste groups for limited resources. Which of these phenomena
dominates can be tested by dividing the sample into two groups based on the relative
populations of STs. Five states in our sample have an ST population proportion of at least
20To be clear, we are not claiming to empirically test whether this policy guidance has worked. Since
our data are cross-sectional, we cannot examine changes over time, and thus relate changes in policy to
changes in access. Instead, our focus is on the presence of caste-wise differences at a given point in time,
within a wider policy context that has long emphasised access to credit for disadvantaged groups.
21See Kijima (2006) for a detailed background and discussion of the socio-economic status of STs.
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20%: Jharkhand (48%), Chhattisgarh (41%), Madhya Pradesh (20%), Orissa (21%) and
Gujarat (18%).22 We now examine loan application and approval rates by caste in these
states and, separately, in the remaining 13 states where STs are very small minorities.
The bottom half of table 4 summarises the results for these two groups of states. The
specification used is the same as model 4 in table 2, which uses all available covariates.
Full regression results are presented in appendix A. These probabilities suggest that the
lower loan approval rates for STs in the full sample arise from states where STs are a
substantial proportion of the population. States where STs are a very small part of the
population do have lower approval rates for ST, but these are only marginally lower than
those for non-STs, a trend confirmed by the corresponding p-values as well. In other
words, of the two phenomena outlined above, the possibility of discrimination due to
being a visible minority seems to dominate any political and economic agency that STs
can muster. This result is similar to Das et al’s (2012) finding that poverty reduction
rates are slower amongst STs who reside in states with significant ST populations.
Unfortunately we are unable to consider North-Eastern states in our analysis, where STs
are a significant proportion of the population and the majority in some. This limitation
is due to the sample size available. There are only 33 farmer households in our data who
applied for credit in these states, of which 17 received a loan, thus making it impractical
to use regression analysis to model any caste-wise differences. That said, these states are
also culturally and economically isolated from other parts of India, have sparser bank
networks, and are thus likely to be distinct from the 18 states we are focusing on.
5 Discussion
Patterns of differential access to bank loans by caste-group bear structural similarities
to the insights from studies on labour market discrimination by gender and race. Is
there evidence of discrimination against certain caste-groups? If so, what is the nature of
this discrimination? We investigate these questions in the Indian context, distinguishing
between statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination. Our paper finds that
Scheduled Tribe borrowers are, after controlling for relevant characteristics, less likely to
have a loan application approved relative to other three caste groups (89% versus 94-95%).
Through counterfactual simulations, we argue that statistical discrimination stemming
22In our data, population proportions as a whole and not just for farmers, are: Jharkhand (36%),
Chhattisgarh (29%), Madhya Pradesh (16%), Orissa (17%) and Gujarat (13%). These are still the five
states with the highest proportion of STs.
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from banks using caste belonging as a proxy for unobserved characteristics (e.g. credit
histories) is unlikely. That is, ST borrowers likely face taste-based discrimination.
Burgess and Pande (2005) show that overall access to bank loans for SCs and STs im-
proved during 1980s due to banking policy even as it slightly regressed during the 1990s.
Despite the absence of legislation against discrimination in access to credit unlike the
Equal Credit Opportunities Act in the USA for instance, the RBI has long propagated
lending directives to banks emphasising improved access for SCs and STs. This paper
finds that the magnitude of difference in loan approvals is indeed very little across caste
groups. Overall, this suggests that RBI guidance emphasising inclusion has proved largely
successful, even as we find that STs face persistent, though marginally (∼5%) lower rates
of loan approval. Our finding that caste-wise differences are significantly muted for small
farmers – those who own less than 5 acres of land – is again consistent with the RBI’s
guidance encouraging lending to weaker sections of society. Not only do we find no evi-
dence of caste discrimination in lending to small farmers, but crucially, small farmer SCs
and STs are more likely to apply for loans relative to the full sample.
Another finding concerns the prevalence of discrimination across states. We find that
lending in states where STs constitute very small minorities in terms of population is less
likely to exhibit taste-based discrimination. On the other hand, we find that taste-based
discrimination in loan approvals exists in states where STs have a significant population,
though still a minority. This suggests that having a significant demographic presence
does not necessarily guarantee that discriminatory practices will weaken.
The process of getting a loan involves applying for one, and having this application ap-
proved. Typically, studies have focused on overall access and hence fail to distinguish
between these two steps (e.g. Burgess et al., 2005; Kumar, 2013). Our analysis shows that
loan application rates account for a major component of inter-caste differences in loan
access. SCs and STs are less likely to apply for bank loans compared to OBCs and higher
castes, and this pattern remains even after controlling for various relevant characteristics.
Thus, dynamic patterns of overall access need to decomposed into application and ap-
proval rates to better comprehend the mechanism behind any changes due to policy. Our
study, though cross-sectional, demonstrates the importance of this distinction by showing
that application rates differ substantially across caste-groups.
Why do loan application rates differ by caste? Studies on labour market discrimination
potentially offer insight into the role of expectations and demand. In these studies , part
of the difference in pay (say) by gender or race can stem from a failure to demand higher
pay. In other words, driven by expectations potentially based on experience, individuals
21
belonging to certain groups can resign themselves and forego better outcomes. This occurs
regardless of any form of discrimination. In the same vein, it is possible that STs and SCs
might hesitate to apply for bank loans because they have learned, as a community if not
as individuals, that they are less likely to receive them.23 A corroborating observation is
that education and income levels, arguably linked to expectations as well, are on average
lower for SCs and STs than for higher castes and OBCs. In this light, the efficacy of
all policies aimed at creating a level playing field including better financial access, might
be consequently constrained in the presence of pessimistic expectations.24 Unfortunately
this explanation cannot be tested with the data at hand, because expectations themselves
are unobserved.
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Appendix A Logit regression results
Tables 5 and 6 show the logit regression results for the full sample loan applications and
approvals, respectively. All models contain state fixed effects and robust standard errors
that account for village-level clustering.
Tables 7 and 8 shows subpopulation-wise Logit regression results for loan applications and
approvals, respectively. These subpopulations are defined according to land ownership
and ST population proportions. These are the full regression results for sections 4.3 and
4.2. All models contain state fixed effects and robust standard errors that account for
village-level clustering.
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Table 5: Logit regression results: loan applications
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Brahmin (base)
OBC -0.115 0.0403 0.0732 0.0719
(0.0905) (0.0911) (0.0916) (0.0917)
SC -0.633∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗ -0.244∗ -0.245∗
(0.117) (0.124) (0.126) (0.127)
ST -0.890∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.144) (0.147) (0.150)
(log) land owned 0.476∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.0521) (0.0514) (0.0507)
(log) land rented in 0.109∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.0478) (0.0473) (0.0480)
(log) land rented out -0.103 -0.102 -0.104
(0.0628) (0.0639) (0.0638)
(log) HH cons. exp. 0.537∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.0628) (0.0747) (0.0750)
HH income -0.000000315 -0.000000363∗ -0.000000366∗
(0.000000193) (0.000000189) (0.000000188)
age HH head 0.0000993 0.000200
(0.00275) (0.00275)
male HH head 0.564∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.195)
Years of edu highest male 0.0399∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗
(0.00900) (0.00895)
Years of edu highest female 0.00714 0.00630
(0.00851) (0.00849)
HH size -0.0141 -0.0139
(0.0179) (0.0179)
HH propn adult males 0.0798 0.0671
(0.243) (0.243)
HH propn adult females -0.241 -0.238
(0.286) (0.286)
(log) distance nearest town 0.135∗∗
(0.0688)
% HHs with electricity 0.00360∗∗
(0.00172)
(log) distance closest bank branch 0.0302
(0.0483)
Constant -0.768∗∗∗ -7.581∗∗∗ -7.305∗∗∗ -8.183∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.717) (0.844) (0.906)
N 8543 8543 8543 8543
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All models contain state dummies
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Table 6: Logit regression results: loan approvals
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Brahmin (base)
OBC 0.0605 0.110 0.199 0.187
(0.256) (0.249) (0.244) (0.248)
SC -0.195 -0.0529 0.141 0.144
(0.351) (0.347) (0.331) (0.333)
ST -1.000∗∗∗ -0.832∗∗ -0.727∗∗ -0.648∗
(0.355) (0.343) (0.345) (0.339)
(log) land owned 0.352∗∗ 0.365∗∗ 0.388∗∗
(0.160) (0.160) (0.166)
(log) land rented in 0.297∗∗ 0.307∗∗ 0.313∗∗
(0.145) (0.142) (0.143)
(log) land rented out -0.130 -0.155 -0.174
(0.166) (0.179) (0.174)
(log) HH cons. exp. 0.0882 0.173 0.147
(0.168) (0.168) (0.166)
HH income -4.73e-09 1.68e-08 -1.83e-08
(0.000000449) (0.000000448) (0.000000403)
age HH head -0.0182∗∗ -0.0191∗∗
(0.00781) (0.00788)
male HH head 0.422 0.439
(0.350) (0.344)
Years of edu highest male -0.00757 -0.00964
(0.0268) (0.0273)
Years of edu highest female 0.0441 0.0415
(0.0307) (0.0311)
HH size -0.0523 -0.0464
(0.0399) (0.0407)
HH propn adult males 2.088∗∗ 2.135∗∗
(0.868) (0.886)
HH propn adult females -0.0474 -0.0348
(0.927) (0.936)
(log) distance nearest town 0.0370
(0.171)
% HHs with electricity 0.00457
(0.00436)
(log) distance closest bank branch -0.159
(0.124)
Constant 3.981∗∗∗ 2.415 1.314 1.361
(0.739) (1.963) (2.168) (2.420)
N 3619 3619 3619 3619
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All models contain state dummies
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Table 7: Subpopulation logit regression: loan applications
Small farmers Large farmers Tribal states Remaining states
Brahmin (base)
OBC -0.000356 0.125 -0.0938 0.117
(0.180) (0.104) (0.175) (0.104)
SC -0.238 -0.198 -0.602∗∗ -0.165
(0.206) (0.162) (0.245) (0.143)
ST -0.238 -0.496∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗ -0.349
(0.267) (0.178) (0.233) (0.223)
(log) land owned 0.963∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.0754) (0.0839) (0.0612)
(log) land rented in 0.163∗ 0.128∗∗ -0.103 0.168∗∗∗
(0.0894) (0.0576) (0.0760) (0.0590)
(log) land rented out -0.208 -0.0990 -0.0853 -0.113
(0.373) (0.0658) (0.102) (0.0781)
(log) HH cons. exp. 0.334∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.0925) (0.126) (0.0886)
HH income 0.000000176 -0.000000418∗∗ -0.00000104∗∗∗ -0.000000165
(0.000000333) (0.000000196) (0.000000390) (0.000000180)
age HH head 0.00568 -0.00345 -0.00140 0.000110
(0.00547) (0.00309) (0.00483) (0.00330)
male HH head 0.275 0.665∗∗∗ 0.474∗ 0.594∗∗
(0.331) (0.239) (0.286) (0.232)
Years of edu highest male 0.0327∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0569∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0106)
Years of edu highest female 0.00987 0.00410 -0.0340∗∗ 0.0174∗
(0.0155) (0.0108) (0.0168) (0.00961)
HH size -0.00201 -0.0174 -0.0292 -0.0118
(0.0360) (0.0206) (0.0295) (0.0209)
HH propn adult males 0.409 -0.126 -0.473 0.236
(0.474) (0.285) (0.419) (0.294)
HH propn adult females -0.533 -0.0808 0.594 -0.552
(0.517) (0.347) (0.525) (0.341)
(log) distance nearest town 0.0130 0.184∗∗ -0.0631 0.215∗∗
(0.107) (0.0793) (0.104) (0.0850)
% HHs with electricity 0.00186 0.00474∗∗ 0.00737∗∗ 0.00178
(0.00264) (0.00210) (0.00292) (0.00209)
(log) distance closest bank branch -0.0317 0.0635 0.0186 0.0328
(0.0760) (0.0547) (0.0871) (0.0567)
Constant -6.922∗∗∗ -8.454∗∗∗ -10.77∗∗∗ -7.504∗∗∗
(1.528) (1.154) (1.399) (1.077)
Observations 2788 5755 2619 5924
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All models contain state dummies
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Table 8: Subpopulation logit regression: loan approvals
Small farmers Large farmers Tribal states Remaining states
Brahmin (base)
OBC -0.535 0.526∗ -1.004 0.321
(0.465) (0.296) (0.655) (0.273)
SC -0.640 0.453 -1.161 0.220
(0.577) (0.394) (0.759) (0.356)
ST -0.874 -0.471 -2.072∗∗∗ -0.216
(0.680) (0.388) (0.635) (0.528)
(log) land owned 0.834∗∗ 0.235 0.872∗∗ 0.297∗
(0.354) (0.242) (0.434) (0.179)
(log) land rented in 0.611∗∗∗ 0.321∗ 0.444 0.324∗
(0.236) (0.189) (0.351) (0.166)
(log) land rented out 0.0957 -0.127 -0.169 -0.203
(0.658) (0.190) (0.241) (0.209)
(log) HH cons. exp. 0.0467 0.287 -0.332 0.150
(0.355) (0.194) (0.331) (0.194)
HH income 0.00000463∗ -0.000000375 -0.00000186∗∗ 0.000000283
(0.00000243) (0.000000617) (0.000000899) (0.000000808)
age HH head -0.0172 -0.0184∗∗ -0.0383∗∗ -0.0146
(0.0138) (0.00916) (0.0167) (0.00898)
male HH head 1.220∗∗ 0.0747 -0.0642 0.562
(0.488) (0.465) (0.773) (0.367)
Years of edu highest male -0.0277 0.00948 -0.0464 -0.000203
(0.0388) (0.0359) (0.0534) (0.0310)
Years of edu highest female 0.138∗∗∗ -0.00825 0.0641 0.0369
(0.0483) (0.0377) (0.0543) (0.0371)
HH size -0.215∗∗∗ 0.0168 0.192∗∗ -0.0908∗∗
(0.0796) (0.0548) (0.0753) (0.0447)
HH propn adult males 2.996∗∗ 1.373 2.388∗ 2.162∗
(1.346) (1.175) (1.229) (1.149)
HH propn adult females 0.202 0.268 1.867 -0.555
(1.592) (1.145) (1.600) (1.129)
(log) distance nearest town -0.340 0.291 -0.197 0.154
(0.271) (0.216) (0.324) (0.199)
% HHs with electricity -0.00954 0.0102∗∗ 0.00795 0.00257
(0.00765) (0.00501) (0.00754) (0.00499)
(log) distance closest bank branch -0.138 -0.183 -0.237 -0.129
(0.185) (0.165) (0.198) (0.149)
Constant 3.474 13.63 3.664 1.158
(4.676) (.) (4.342) (2.766)
Observations 744 2845 1014 2605
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All models contain state dummies
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Appendix B Loan amounts and interest rates
Our main analysis focuses on the binary event of obtaining a loan. In this appendix,
we examine whether loan amounts or interest rates differ systematically by caste. There
is inherent sample selection in the data for loan amounts and interest rates because the
survey questionnaire asks about these attributes only for the largest loan borrowed by
the household in the five years preceding the survey. 70% (survey weighted) of the farmer
households in our sample who received a bank loan declare this to be their largest loan
and thus provide information on amounts and interest rates. 62% of these (i.e. 43% of
the total) declare that this loan was for agriculture or agricultural equipment purchase.
The top panel of table 9 summarises average and regression-adjusted annualised interest
rates according to caste-group. The regression-adjusted values are calculated as linear
predictions from a model that includes all the covariates used in model 4 in table 2, that
is, caste, land and income, education and household composition, village characteristics,
and state dummies. Interest rates on agricultural bank loans do differ by caste group, with
the lower caste-groups, viz. SCs and STs, reporting lower interest rates than Brahmins or
OBCs. This pattern persists even after borrower characteristics are accounted for, though
the inter-caste differences become smaller. This should not be surprising, because the
RBI encourages agricultural lending to SCs and STs at lower rates of interest under the
‘Differential Rate of Interest Scheme’ (Reserve Bank of India, 2011). For bank loans not
restricted to agricultural purposes, the same pattern is visible but inter-caste differences
are no longer statistically significant.
Loan amounts are summarised in the bottom panel of table 9. In contrast to interest
rates, these reflect the conventional caste-group hierarchy, with Brahmins receiving larger
loans, followed by OBCs, SCs and STs in decreasing order. This order is visible for all
bank loans. Regression-adjustment in this table is performed using Poisson regression
models, where the dependent variable is loan amounts and the covariates used are as in
model 4 in table 2.25 The regression-adjusted results show that inter-caste differences are
no longer statistically significant once socio-economic characteristics are controlled for.
Overall, these results suggest that conditional on household and village characteristics,
loan amounts and interests rates do not differ significantly by caste-group with the pos-
sible exception of interest rates on agricultural loans.
25See section 19.2 of Wooldridge (2010) for a discussion on the rationale behind using Poisson regression
when the dependent variable has a highly skewed distribution, as our data for loan amounts does.
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Appendix C Additional simulation results
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(a) ST vs non-ST loan approval gap (µST = 0.25)
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(c) ST vs non-ST loan approval gap (µST = 0.5)
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
µ
no
n (
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
no
n-
ST
s w
ith
 g
oo
d 
cr
ed
it h
ist
or
y)
 
0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1.00
Probability of loan approval conditional on good credit history
>0.1
0.05-0.1
0-0.05
p-values
(d) p-values (µST = 0.5)
Figure 2: Simulation results for µST = 0.25 and µST = 0.5
Notes: This figures summarise the results from the simulation exercise. µST = 0.25 for subfigures
(a) and (b), while µST = 0.5 for subfigures (c) and (d) where µST denotes the proportion of
STs with good credit histories. Values for µnon, viz. the proportion of non-STs with good credit
histories, are along the y-axis, while values for b, viz. the probability that banks will approve
a loan conditional on having a good credit history, are along the x-axis. Each point in both
figures thus corresponds to a given distribution of credit histories H according to combinations of
{b, µST = 0.25, µnon}. For each combination, the simulation is performed 200 times to re-estimate
model 4 in table 2 with caste simplified to ST and non-ST, and with H included as an additional
regressor. For each regression, we calculate the difference in sample average predicted probabilities
of loan approval for STs and non-STs. The left-hand side subfigures (a) and (c) show the average
of these differences across simulations, i.e. the likelihood by which STs are less likely to have a
loan approved than are non-STs once credit histories are controlled for. Subfigures (b) and (d)
show the corresponding p-values calculated using equation 3. The simulations for µST = 0.25 are
based on Akima interpolation using a grid of 694 values, while those for µST = 0.5 use a grid of
334 values, with 200 simulations for each point. The blank areas are due to several combinations
of {b, µST , µnon} being unfeasible since all four probabilities that characterise the distribution of
H must lie between 0 and 1 using eq. 10.
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